Abstract-We have introduced a novel adversary model in Chosen-Ciphertext Attack with Timing Attack (CCA2-TA) [1] and it was a practical model because the model incorporates the timing attack. This paper is an extended paper for "A Secure TFTP Protocol with Security Proofs" [1] .
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a continuation from our previous work in years 2012 and 2014 [1] - [3] . The paper was written in a general information security terminology with a simple mathematical notation (semi-formal). It was intended for information security practitioner and not for mathematician or cryptographer as the main audience. We hope that this paper will give a worthy understanding of adversary model in Chosen-Ciphertext Attack with Timing Attack and its security proofs. We have considered this paper as a draft paper 1 .
II. RESEARCH GOAL

A. Objectives
The purpose of this research work is to facilitate a timingattack in the random oracle model. We add the timing-attack in an Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA2) model.
B. Motivations
Referring to our previous work [3] [1], we have mentioned the need of a secure TFTP protocol particularly in various network administrative tasks such as monitoring and upgrading of remote embedded device's firmware, where a lightweight protocol such as TFTP is usually employed. The security risks in such situations were also discussed with emphasis on concerns due to physical attacks wherein attackers access and modify Wi-Fi AP hardware and software [4] - [7] . In a preceding work, we proposed an enhanced data communication package for DENX-UBOOT [8] firmware to include a secure TFTP protocol. However, our proposal did not suggest a specific cryptographic protocol for the successful implementation of the secure TFTP protocol [3] . In the effort to further augment the work, a proven secure and practical asymmetric cryptographic scheme, i.e. the Cramer-Shoup (CS) protocol is proposed to be deployed as the underlying cryptographic protocol [9] in the overall scheme. One may refer to [1] .
III. RELATED WORK
A. Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA)
Goldwasser-Micali (1982) [10] proposed a probabilistic encryption to replace a trapdoor-function for a better security evaluation in any encryption scheme. The authors argued that, trapdoor-function do not cover "the possibility of computing from ( ) when is of special form" and "the possibility of easily computing some partial information about from ( )" [10] . The probabilistic encryption gives a better security property with equal to a probability of flipping a coin such that Goldwasser-Micali proposed an adversary model that gives the adversary a knowledge of encryption protocol and its algorithm, but the adversary cannot obtain any information about a plaintext when given a ciphertext, except that a length of plaintext if an encryption scheme ratio was : for plaintext to ciphertext. The knowledge of plaintext's length is easy to be obtained by the adversary because of the knowledge of the cryptographic protocol algorithm. To simulate the Goldwasser-Micali's adversary model (CPA), we use indistinguishability test by let an adversary to choose two plaintexts ( 0 , 1 ) ℳ where ( 0 ≠ 1 ) and | 0 | = | 1 |. The plaintexts either ( 0 , 1 ) is randomly choose to be encrypted using encryption scheme Π = ( , ℰ, ) by a Challenger:
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A ciphertext * is given to the Adversary for a distinguishability test wherein the ciphertext * is either encrypted of ( 0 , 1 ) . The encryption scheme Π is semantically secure if any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms that are used in the adversary model to determine a correct plaintext from ciphertext * with a negligible probability. Goldwasser-Micali (1984) [11] showed that the probabilistic encryption can be implemented under intractability assumption of quadratic residuosity.
B. Indistinguishability-Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA1)
IND-CCA1 is that give an adversary to access decryption function through a decryption oracle. The adversary can ask the oracle to decrypt any ciphertexts except the one (e.g. * ) that being use for indistinguishability test. This adversary model gives the Adversary more knowledge than CPA's model. However, the decryption oracle can be used by the adversary before the indistinguishability test is happen. Naor-Yung (1990) [12] was the leading that succeed in the IND-CCA1 to prove their public key cryptosystem is secure when the adversary is allow to access decryption oracle before execution of indistinguishability test. The scheme [12] use a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) with proofs that their protocol satisfied the completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties in PPT for a sufficient large in the ( ).
C. Indistinguishability-Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2)
Rackoff-Simon (1991) [13] argued that an adversary in CCA1 may get an access to a decryption oracle even after the challenge's ciphertext * was issued. This attack is a practical security problem because it can be happen in a real-world. A security property for this kind of attack is that prevent the adversary from getting any useful information from other ciphertext that can helps to get a non-negligible advantage to distinguish the challenge's ciphertext * in a polynomial time. The authors [13] stressed that it is important to secure against this attack because a digital signature scheme (practical scheme in the real-world) that is vulnerable to this attack. The digital signature scheme is secure "if any such attacker succeeds in generating a valid signature for this last document with negligible probability" [13] .
IND-CCA2 model is that give an adversary to access decryption function through decryption oracle. The adversary can ask the oracle to decrypt any ciphertext except the one (ciphertext * ) that being use for indistinguishability test. with nonnegligible advantage in PPT; we conclude that the Adversary has an "advantage" and the given protocol Π is consider not secure in terms of indistinguishability. We propose an attack model of Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack with Timing Attack (CCA2-TA) is that gives an adversary to access identical computing resources in term of computing power (e.g. CPU). The adversary is given the knowledge of time to perform cryptographic computations (e.g. primitive computation and protocol execution) in polynomial time. These were included that the adversary know the delay of network transmission for all transaction in the Phase 1, Phase 2 and Challenge (refer to Figure 2 ).The adversary is also has the knowledge of CCA2. We defined the proposed security model in general terminology as below: 
